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active during seasons of fixed length separated by winter periods. All individuals die at
the end of the season and the size of the next generation is determined by the number
of offspring produced during the past season. The rate at which the consumers produce
immature offspring depends on their internal energy which can be increased by feeding. The
reproduction of the resource simply occurs at a constant rate.
At the beginning, we consider a population of consumers maximizing their common
fitness, all consumers being individuals having the same goal function and acting for the
common good. We suppose that a small fraction of the consumer population may appear
at the beginning of one season and start to behave as mutants in the main population. We
study how such invasion occurs.
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Une analyse évolutionnaire dans un système
consommateurs-ressources.
Résumé : Dans ce travail nous étudions les processus évolutifs à l’oeuvre dans un sys-
tème consommateurs-ressources “saisonnier" dans lequel les consommateurs ont un compro-
mis dynamique à faire entre le temps alloué à la recherche de nourriture et celui alloué à
leur reproduction. Les individus sont actifs pendant des saisons de longueur fixe, séparées
par des périodes d’hiver où seuls les immatures produits durant la saison survivent (oeufs,
graines,...). La taille de la génération suivante de matures est alors déterminée par ce nombre
de survivants.
Dans ce rapport, nous considérons d’abord une population de consommateurs qui maxi-
misent leur “fitness” commune (l’efficacité reproductive de la population entière), tous les
consommateurs ayant ce même objectif; ils agissent en quelque sorte pour le bien commun.
Nous supposons par la suite qu’une petite fraction de la population des consommateurs peut
apparaître au début d’une saison et choisir une stratégie différente de celle de la population
principale; nous appellerons ces individus déviants “mutants". Nous étudions en détails la
stratégie mise en oeuvre par ces mutants et analysons pour finir leur capacité ou non à
supplanter la population résidente.
Mots-clés : Commande optimale, Jeux différentiels, Modèle consommateur-resource,
Invasion
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1 Introduction
Biodiversity found on Earth consists of millions of biological species, thousands of different
ecosystems. Among this variety, one can easily identify many examples of resource-consumer
systems like prey-predator/parasitoid-host systems known in biology [1] or birth-death sys-
tems known in cell biochemistry [2]. Usually, individuals involved in such kind of systems
(bacteria, plants, insects, animals) have conflicting interests and models describing such in-
teractions are based on principles of game theory [3, 4, 5, 6]. Hence the investigation of these
models is of interest both for game theoreticians and for biologists working in behavioral
and evolutionary ecology.
One of the first questions that usually appears when first consulting evolutionary the-
ory books is the following: could we say that individuals behave rationally or optimally
throughout their life? The answer is most probably “yes” if we consider the evolution as a
slow process tending to some equilibrium. Following Darwin theory and its main statement
about the survival of the fittest, we can assume that evolution of populations leads to a
situation where individuals maximize their fitness or try to protect themselves from invasion
by others [7, 8]. Such population can be referred to as residents who use an optimal maxi-
mizing strategy or an uninvadable strategy respectively. The first type of strategy could be
dynamically stable and lead to an asymptotically stable equilibrium, but it could also not
be. Particularly, and this is a well-known fact in economics, a free-rider may overcompete
competitors cooperating with him by “cheating” and using a “greedy” strategy. In the se-
quel, populations which behave differently from the residents will be termed mutants. On
the other hand, if residents use an evolutionary stable strategy, this will not allow them to
get the maximum possible value of the fitness but will help them avoid mutant invasion.
This seems reasonable from a biological point of view but such strategy could be dynamically
unreachable or could not lead to a stable equilibrium in a long-term perspective [9].
In this work we study the process of mutant invasion on an example of a consumer-
resource system with annual character of the behavior as introduced by [10]. Namely, indi-
viduals are active during seasons of fixed length T separated by winter periods. To give a
representation of what such a system could encompass, the resource population could repre-
sent plants producing seeds all season long, and the consumer population insects having to
trade-off between feeding and laying eggs. All individuals die at the end of the season and
the size of the next generation is determined by the number of offspring (seeds or eggs) pro-
duced during the past season. The rate at which the consumers produce immature offspring
(eggs) depends on their internal energy which can be increased by feeding. The reproduction
of the resource simply occurs at a constant rate.
In nature several patterns of life-history of the consumers can be singled out, but they
almost always contains two main phases: growth phase and reproduction phase. Depending
on initial conditions the transition between them could be strict when the consumers only
feed at the beginning of their life and only reproduce at the end, or there could exist
an intermediate phase between them where growth and reproduction occur simultaneously.
Such types of behaviors are called determinate and indeterminate growth pattern respectively
[11].
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Time-sharing between laying eggs and feeding for the consumers is described by the vari-
able u: u = 1 means feeding, u = 0 on the other side means reproducing. The intermediate
control u ∈ (0, 1) describes a situation where, for some part of the time, the individual is
feeding and, for the other part of the time, it is reproducing.
At the beginning of the paper, we consider a population of consumers maximizing their
common fitness, all consumers being individuals having the same goal function and acting
for the common good. We will call them the residents in the following. We suppose that a
small fraction of the consumer population may appear at the beginning of one season and
start to behave as mutants in the main population. We study how such invasion will occur.
If there is a large number of residents, it makes sense to assume that residents fix their
strategy a priori and do not change it during the season. The mutant achieves better result
than the resident using this fact and react in feedback form. Such a problem can be related
to a hierarchical game of two players. For simplicity we study this problem in the case of a
vanishingly small number of mutants. Such a situation corresponds to the definition of an
evolutionarily stable strategy given by [7], when only a small fraction of mutants is taken
into consideration. We also investigate the fate of such a mutation in the multi-seasonal
framework proposed by [10]. In particular we show that mutants not only can invade the
resident consumers’ population, but will also replace it in the system. Finally, we make
some conclusions regarding the results presented in the paper.
2 Main model
2.1 Previous work
At the beginning consider a system of two populations: consumers and resource without
any mutant. As it has been stated, all seasons have fixed length T which does not change
from one year to another (see Fig. 1). The consumer population is determined by two state
variables: the average energy of one individual p and the number of consumers c present
in the system. For the description of the resource population a variable n is introduced.
It defines the size of the population. We suppose that both populations consist of two
parts: mature (insects/plants) and immature part (eggs/seeds). During the season, mature
individuals can invest in immatures by laying eggs. Between seasons (at winter periods) all
matures die and immatures become matures for the next season.
We suppose that all consumers have arbitrarily small energy p at the beginning of the
season. The efficiency of the reproduction is assumed to be proportional to the value of
p; it is thus intuitively understandable that consumers should feed on the resource at the
beginning and reproduce at the end once they have gathered enough energy. The consumer
has a trade-off between feeding (u = 1) and laying eggs (u = 0). The variable u plays the
role of the control.
The within season dynamics are thus defined as follows
p˙ = −ap+ bnu, n˙ = −cnu (1)
INRIA
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Figure 1: Seasonal character of the behavior: populations evolve continuously during the
season and have discrete rules for the transition from one season to another. Picture has
been taken from [12]
where we supposed that both populations do not suffer from mortality; a, b and c are some
constants. After rescaling of time and state variables, the constants a and b can be eliminated
and equations (1) can be rewritten in a simplified form
p˙ = −p+ nu, n˙ = −cnu (2)
where c is represent the number of predators present in the system.
The amount of offspring produced by individual during the season depends on the current
size of the populations
J =
∫ T
0
θc(1− u(t))p(t) dt, Jn =
∫ T
0
γn(t) dt (3)
where consumers are maximizing the value J , the common fitness, θ and γ are some con-
stants. We see that this is an optimal control problem which can be solved using the dynamic
programming [13] or Pontryagin maximum principle [14]. Moreover, the constants c, θ and
γ can be omitted to compute the solution of this problem without loss of generality.
One can also show that all the data of the formulated problem are homogeneous of
degree one in state variables, which can be only positive numbers. This is a particular case
of Noether’s theorem in the calculus of variations about the problems whose data is invariant
under a group of transformations [15]. Hence the dimension of phase space of the optimal
control problem (2-3) can be lowered by one unit by the introduction of a new variable
x = p/n. In this case its dynamics can be written in a form
x˙ = −x(1 − cu) + u
RR n° 7312
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Figure 2: Optimal collective behavior of the residents
and the Bellman function – a solution of an optimal control problem U˜(p, n, t) =
∫ T
T−t
(1 −
u(s))p(s)ds with the starting point at (p(t), n(t)) = (p, n), can be present as U˜(p, n, t) =
nU(x, t).
The solution of the optimal control problem (2-3) has been obtained before [10] and the
optimal behavioral pattern for z = 1.5 and T = 2 is shown on Fig. 2. The region with u = 1
is separated from the region with u = 0 by a switching curve S and a singular arc Sσ such
that
S: x = 1− e−(T−t) (4)
Sσ: T − t = − lnx+
2
xc
−
4
c
(5)
They are shown on Fig. 2 by thick red and green curves correspondingly. Along the singular
arc Sσ the consumer uses intermediate control u = uˆ:
uˆ =
2x
2 + xc
(6)
One might identify a bang-bang control pattern for short seasons T ≤ T1 and a bang-
singular-bang pattern for long seasons T > T1. The value T1 is equal to
T1 =
ln(c+ 1) + (c− 2) ln 2
c− 1
(7)
and it depends on the number of consumers present in the system.
INRIA
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The optimal value of the amount of offspring produced by individual can be computed
using this solution. In the following we concentrate on the process of mutant invasion into
population of consumers which uses the prescribed type of behavior given on Fig. 2.
2.2 Consumer-mutant-resource system
Suppose that there is a subpopulation of consumers that acts as a mutant population. They
maximize their own part of the fitness taking into account that the main population relates
them as kin individuals.
Denote the fraction of the mutants with respect to the whole population of consumers by
ε and variables describing a state of the mutant and resident populations by symbols with
subindices “m” and “r” correspondingly. Then the number of mutants and residents will be
cm = εc and cr = (1− ε)c and the dynamics of the system can be written in a form
p˙r = −pr + nur, p˙m = −pm + num, n˙ = −nc [(1 − ε)ur + εum] (8)
similarly to (2). The variable um ∈ [0, 1] defines a life-time decision pattern of the mutants.
The control ur ∈ [0, 1] is fixed and defined by the solution of the optimal control problem
(2-3).
The number of offspring for the next season is defined similarly to (3):
Jr =
∫ T
0
θ(1 − ur(t))crpr(t) dt, Jm =
∫ T
0
θ(1− um(t))cmpm(t) dt, Jn =
∫ T
0
γn(t) dt (9)
where the mutant chooses its control um striving to maximize its criterion Jm.
We can see that the problem under consideration is described in terms of a two-step
optimal control problem (or a hierarchical differential game): on the first step we define the
optimal behavior of the residents, on the second step we identify the optimal response of
the mutants to this strategy.
3 Optimal free-riding
Since θ and γ are some constants, they can be omitted from the solution of the optimization
problem Jm → max
um
. In this case the functional Jm/(θcm) can be taken instead of the
functional Jm.
Let one introduce the Bellman function U˜m for the mutant population. It provides a
solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation
∂U˜m
∂t
+max
um
[
∂U˜m
∂pr
(−pr + nur) +
∂U˜m
∂pm
(−pm + num)−
∂U˜m
∂n
nc((1− ε)ur + εum) + pm(1 − um)
]
= 0 (10)
RR n° 7312
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Introducing new variables xr = pr/n and xm = pm/n and using a transformation of the
Bellman function in the form U˜m(pr, pm, n, t) = nUm(xr, xm, t), we can reduce the dimension
of the problem by one using Noether’s theorem. The modified HJB-equation (10) takes the
following form
∂Um
∂t
+max
um
{∂Um
∂xr
[−xr(1 − c((1− ε)ur + εum)) + ur] +
∂Um
∂xm
[−xm(1 − c((1− ε)ur + εum)) + um]−
Umc((1− ε)ur + εum) + xm(1− um)
}
= 0 (11)
Since the boundary conditions are defined at the terminal time it is convenient to construct
the solution in backward time τ = T − t. If we denote the components of the Bellman
function as ∂Um/∂xr = λr, ∂Um/∂xm = λm and ∂Um/∂τ = ν, equation (11) can be written
as follows
H
.
= −ν +max
um
{
λr [−xr(1 − c((1− ε)ur + εum)) + ur] +
λm [−xm(1− c((1 − ε)ur + εum)) + um]−
Umc((1− ε)ur + εum) + xm(1− um)
}
= 0 (12)
where the optimal control is defined as
um = Heav(Am), Am = ∂H/∂um = λxrεz + λm(1 + xmεc)− Umεc− xm .
One of the efficient ways to solve the HJB-equation is to use the method of characteristics
(see e.g. [16]). The system of characteristics for equation (12) reads
x′r = −∂H/∂λr = xr(1− c((1− ε)ur + εum))− ur,
x′m = −∂H/∂λm = xm(1− c((1− ε)ur + εum))− um,
λ′r = ∂H/∂xr + λr∂H/∂Um = −λr,
λ′m = ∂H/∂xm + λm∂H/∂Um = −λm + 1− um,
ν ′ = ν∂H/∂Um = −νc((1− ε)u+ εum),
U ′m = −λr∂H/∂λr − λm∂H/∂λm + ν =
− Umc((1 − ε)ur + εum) + xm(1− um)
(13)
where the prime denotes differentiation with respect to backward time: g′ = dg/dτ = −g˙.
The terminal condition Um(xr , xm, T ) = 0 gives that λr(T ) = λm(T ) = 0. Then Am(T ) < 0
and um(T ) = 0 as it could have been predicted before.
INRIA
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Figure 3: First steps of the construction of the solution
3.1 First steps
If we emit the characteristic field from the terminal surface t = T with ur = um = 0 then
x′r = xr, x
′
m = xm, λ
′
r = −λr, λ
′
m = −λm + 1, U
′
m = xm ,
λr(T ) = λm(T ) = 0, Um(T ) = 0 .
We get the following equations for state and conjugate variables and for the Bellman function
xr = xr(T )e
τ , xm = xm(T )e
τ , λr = 0, λm = 1− e
−τ , Um = xm(1− e
−τ ) .
From this solution we can see that there could exist a switching surface Sm:
Sm: xm = 1− e
−(T−t) (14)
such that Am = 0 on it and where the mutant is changing its control. Equation (14) is
similar to (4). But we should take into account the fact that there is also a hypersurface
Sr, where the resident changes its control from ur = 0 to ur = 1 independently on the
RR n° 7312
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decision of the mutant. Hence it is important to define on which surface Sr or Sm the
characteristic comes first, see Fig. 3. Suppose that this is the surface Sr. Since the control
ur changes its value on Sr, the HJB-equation (12) is also changing and, as a consequence,
the conjugate variables ν, λr and λm could possibly have a jump in their values. Let one
denote the incoming characteristic field (in backward time) by “−” and the outcoming field
by “+”. Consider a point of intersection of the characteristic and the surface Sr with the
coordinates (xr1 , xm1 , τ1). Then xr1 = 1 − e
−τ1 and the normal vector ϑ to the switching
surface is written in the form
ϑ = ∇Sr = (∂Sr/∂xr, ∂Sr/∂xm, ∂Sr/∂xm)
T = (−1, 0, 1− xr1)
T .
From the incoming field we have the following information about the co-state
λ−r = 0, λ
−
m = xr1 , ν
− = xm1e
−τ1 = xm1(1− xr1) .
Since the Bellman function is continuous on the surface Sr which means
U+m = U
−
m = Um = xm1(1− e
−τ1) = xm1xr1 .
The gradient ∇Um has a jump in the direction of the normal vector ϑ: ∇U+m = ∇U
−
m + kϑ.
Here k is an unknown scalar. Then
λ+ = −k, λ+m = xr1 , ν
+ = xm1(1− xr1) + k(1− xr1) (15)
If we suppose that the control of the mutant will be the same u+m = 0 (in this case A
+
m
should be negative), the HJB-equation (12) has the form
−ν+ + λ+[−xr1(1 − (1− ε)c) + 1]− λ
+
mxm1(1− (1 − ε)c)− (1 − ε)zUm + xm1 = 0 (16)
By the substitution of the values from (15) to the equation (16) we get
k[−2(1− xr1)− xr1(1− ε)c] = 0 ,
which leads to the fact that k = 0 and, actually, there is no jump in conjugate variables.
They keep the same values as (15) and A+m = A
−
m.
But let one suppose that the mutant reacts on the decision of the resident and also
changes its control on Sr from u−m = 0 to u
+
m = 1. This is fulfilled if the inequality A
+
m > 0
holds.
The HJB-equation (12) has the form
−ν+ + λ+r [−xr1(1 − c) + 1] + λ
+
m[−xm1(1− c) + 1]− zUm = 0 .
Substitution of the values ν+, λ+r and λ
+
m from (15) gives
k =
xr1 − xm1
xr1z + (1− xr1)
INRIA
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Figure 4: Some family of the optimal trajectories emanated from the terminal surface
and
A+m = λ
+
r xr1εc+ λ
+
m(xm1εc+ 1)− εcUm − xm1 = (xr1 − xm1)
(1 − ε)xr1c+ (1− xr1)
xr1c+ (1− xr1)
,
which is positive when xr1 > xm1 . On Fig. 3 this corresponds to the points of the surface
Sr which are below the magenta line: xr = xm = 1 − e−τ . For the optimal trajectories
which go through such points ur(τ1 +0) = um(τ1 +0) = 1. One can show that there will be
no more switches of the control. But if we consider a trajectory going from a point above
the magenta line then ur(τ1 + 0) = 1 and um(τ1 + 0) = 0 and there will be a switch of the
control um from zero to one (in backward time). After that there will be no more switches.
Now consider a trajectory emitted from the terminal surface which comes to the surface
Sm rather than to the surface Sr at first. In this case the following situation as it is shown of
Fig. 4 takes place. One might expect to have a singular arc Sσ1 there. Necessary conditions
for its existence are the following
H = 0 = H0 +Amum, H0 = −ν − λxr − λmxm + xm (17)
RR n° 7312
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Am = 0 = λrxrεc+ λm(xmεc+ 1)− εcUm − xm (18)
A′m = {Am H0} = 0
.
= Am1 (19)
where the curled brackets denote the Poisson (Jacobi) brackets. If ξ is a vector of state
variables and ψ is a vector of conjugate ones (in our case ξ = (xr , xm, τ) and ψ = (λr , λm, ν)),
then the Poisson brackets of two functions F = F (ξ, ψ, Um) and G = G(ξ, ψ, Um) are given
by the formula
{F G} = 〈Fξ + ψ FUm , Gψ〉 − 〈Fψ, Gξ + ψGUm〉 .
Here 〈·, ·〉 denotes the scalar product and e.g.
Fψ = ∂F/∂ψ = (∂F/∂λr, ∂F/∂λm, ∂F/∂ν)
T .
After some calculations the expression (19) takes the form
Am1 = νεc+ xm + λrxrεc− (xm + 1)(1− λr) = 0 (20)
We can derive the variable ν from equation (17) and substitute it to the last equation
(20). We get
Am1 = xm − 1 + λm = 0 .
This leads to λm = 1− xm and
λr =
xm + εUm + (1 − xm)(xmεc+ 1)
xrεz
,
which can be obtained from equation (18).
To derive the singular control um = u˜m ∈ (0, 1) along the singular arc one should write
the second derivative
A′′m = 0 = {{AmH}H} = {{AmH0}(H0 +Amu˜m)} = {{AmH0}H0}+ {{AmH0}Am}u˜m .
Then
u˜m =
{{AmH0}H0}
{Am{AmH0}}
=
2xm
2 + xmεc
(21)
which has the same form as (6).
The equation for the singular arc Sσ1 can be obtained from dynamic equations (13) by
substitution ur = 0 and um = u˜m from (21):
x′m = −
x2mεc
2 + xmεc
, xm(τ = ln 2) = 1/2 .
Finally, we have the analogous expression to (5)
Sσ1 : T − t = − lnxm +
2
xmεc
−
4
εc
(22)
for ε 6= 0. If ε = 0 the surface Sm is a hyperplane xm = 1/2.
After these steps we have the structure of the solution shown on Fig. 5.
INRIA
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Figure 5: Construction of the part of a singular arc Sσ1
3.2 Optimal motion along the surface Sσ
r
Let us consider the surface Sσr which is shown on Fig. 5 by green color and separates the
domain ur = 1 from ur = 0. This leads to a chattering regime with the motion along this
surface. The solution of the dynamic equations can be understood in Fillipov sense.
Suppose that the hypersurface Sσr is also divided into two regions: the region where the
mutant uses um = 0 and the one where um = 1. They are separated by a switching curve
Sˆ and by a singular arc Sˆσ which completely belong to the surface Sσr . Along this surface
the resident uses an intermediate control ur = uˆr resulting from the chattering regime with
simultaneous switches from one bang control ur = 1 to another ur = 0 and vice versa.
We suppose that the trajectory can be forced to stay on the surface Sσr by the resident
independently on the action of the mutant. This means that if we derive the control uˆr from
the dynamic equation
x′r = −
x2rc
2 + xrc
= xr(1 − c((1− ε)uˆr + εum))− uˆr
RR n° 7312
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as
uˆr =
2xr(1 + xrc)
(1 + (1− ε)xrc)(2 + xrc)
−
xrεcum
1 + (1− ε)xrc
(23)
Then uˆr ∈ (0, 1) for all points belonging Sσr and for all possible values um ∈ [0, 1].
To identify for which parameters of the model this is possible, we may notice that uˆr as
a function of um is linear and decreasing. Moreover
ur(um = 0) =
2xr(1 + xrc)
(1 + (1− ε)xrc)(2 + xrc)
≤ 2xr
1 + xrc
2 + xrc
≤ 1 .
since xr ≤ 1/2. Therefore only the condition ur ≥ 0 could be violated for some values of um.
To define the limiting value u˜m for which ur(u˜m < um ≤ 1) < 0 one can use the following
condition: ur(um = u˜m) = 0. This gives
u˜m =
2
εc
1 + xrc
2 + xrc
.
If such value u˜m is outside of the interval (0, 1) then the condition ur ∈ (0, 1) holds for any
xr belonging to Sσr . This occurs if
ε < 1/c (24)
In this paper we consider only the values of ε satisfying (24). This has a biological
explanation since for sufficiently large ε the resident should react to the behavior of the
mutants who does significantly significantly affect the dynamics of the system. A fixed a
priory strategy of the resident does not make sense in that case.
If we consider a field belonging to the surface Sσr , the gradient of the restriction of Um
to that manifold is defined only in the co-tangent bundle. A safe representative requires a
term kns be added to the adjoint equations of the characteristic system, where ns is the
normal to Sσr . The constant k should be chosen to keep the adjoint tangent to it. But we
can notice that the surface Sσr does not depend on xm-coordinate. Since only the dynamics
λm plays an important role for us and the corresponding term is equal zero, this notion can
be neglected.
The control uˆr = uˆr(xr , xm, τ, um) is defined in feedback form, e.g. depends on time and
a state of the system. The corresponding Hamiltonian (12) is changed to
Hˆ = H(xr , xm, Um, λ, λm, ν, uˆr(xr , xm, τ, um), um) . (25)
The coefficient multiplying the control um is also changed to
Aˆm =
∂Hˆ
∂um
=
λm(1 + xr(1− ε)c+ xmεc)− εcUm
1 + (1− ε)xrc
− xm . (26)
In this case the switching surface Sˆ can be defined by the condition Aˆm = 0. The singular
arc Sˆσ – by the following conditions
Hˆ = 0, Aˆm = 0, Aˆ
′
m = {AˆmHˆ} = 0 .
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The intermediate control uˆm can be obtained from the second derivative
Aˆ′′m = {{AˆmHˆ}Hˆ} = 0 .
We can write analytical expressions for Sˆ and Sˆσ but they look quite complicated. To make
things simpler, let us consider first a particular case of vanishingly small values of ε and
study the optimal behavioral pattern.
3.3 Particular case of a vanishingly small population of mutants
We have ε ∼= 0 and the chattering regime of the resident along the surface Sσr results in
ur = uˆr coinciding with (6):
uˆr =
2xr
2 + xrc
which does not depend on the action of the mutant. In addition equations (25) and (26)
take the following form
Hˆ = −ν +
λrx
2
rc
2 + xrc
+ λm
(
−xm
2− xrc
2 + xrc
+ um
)
− Um
2xrc
2 + xrc
+ xm(1 − um) , (27)
Aˆm = λm − xm . (28)
If the trajectory goes from the point xσm
.
= xm(ln 2) > 1/2 then um = 0 and the system
of characteristics for the Hamiltonian (25) is written in the form
x′r = −
x2rc
2 + xrc
, x′m = xm
2− xrc
2 + xrc
, λm = −λm + 1 ,
ν ′ = −ν
2xrc
2 + xrc
, U ′m = −Um
2xrc
2 + xrc
+ xm ,
with boundary conditions
τ = ln 2, xr = 1/2, xm = x
σ
m, λm = 1/2, ν = x
σ
m/2, Um = x
2
m/2 .
Then λm = 1− e−τ and the switching curve Sˆ has the form
xm = 1− e
−τ ,
in addition to τ = − lnxr + 2/(xrc)− 4/c. Thus Sˆ = Sm ∩ Sσr .
The switching curve Sˆ ends at the point with coordinates (xr2 , xm2 , τ2) where the char-
acteristics become tangent to it and the singular arc Sˆσ appears. Before the determination
of the coordinates of this point let one define the singular arc Sˆσ. From equations (27) and
(28) we get
ν =
λrx
2
rc
2 + xrc
− λmxm
2− xrc
2 + xrc
− Um
2xrc
2 + xrc
+ xm, λm = xm
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along the singular arc. Substitution of (3.3) into equation Aˆ′m = 0 gives
xm =
2 + xrc
4
.
Alongside, the intermediate control uˆm can be derived from Aˆ′′m = 0 and it is equal to
uˆm =
1
2 + xrc
,
which is positive and belongs to the segment between zero and one.
We see that the coordinates xr2 , xm2 and τ2 can be defined through the following equa-
tions
xm2 =
2 + xr2c
4
= 1− e−τ2 , τ2 = − lnxr2 +
2
xr2c
−
4
c
,
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which comes from the fact that the point (xr2 , xm2 , τ2) belongs to Sˆ
σ and it is located on
the intersection of the curves Sˆσ and Sˆ. The result is illustrated on Fig. 6.
We can show also that the surface Sσ1 can be extended further with comparison to the
situation on Fig. 5. Indeed, the following conditions are fulfilled for the region with ur = 0:
H
∣∣∣
ur=0
= −ν − λrxr − λmxm + xm = 0, Am = λm − xm = 0, A
′
m = 0 .
Therefore
ν = −λrxr − λmxm + xm, λm = xm ,
and from the condition A′m = 0: −1 + 2xm = 0, which gives xm = 1/2.
Consider now the region with xr smaller that the ones on the green surface Sσr (see
Fig. 6). There is a switching surface which extends the surface Sm and it is defined by the
same equation (14). But there could exist a singular arc Sσ2 starting from some points of
Sm. To check this we have to write the following conditions
H
∣∣∣
ur=1
= −ν − λr(xr(1 − c)− 1)− λmxm(1− c)− zUm + xm = 0 , (29)
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Am = λm − xm = 0, A
′
m = 0 , (30)
which give a possible candidate for a singular arc
Sσ2 : xm =
1
2− c
.
We see that its appearance is possible only for c < 2. In addition, the motion along this
surface occurs with control um = (1 − c)/(2 − c) which also gives the restriction on the
parameter c that c ≤ 1. For c > 1 the structure of the solution in the domain below the
surface Sσr is simpler and consists only of the switching surface Sm, see Fig. 7.
3.4 Computation of the value functions in case of ε = 0
Without loss of generality we can assume that at the beginning of each season the average
energy of the population of consumers is zero: xr(0) = xm(0) = 0. Therefore we should
take into account only the trajectories coming from these zero initial conditions. The phase
space is reduced in this case to the one shown on Fig. 8. One can see that there are three
different regions depending on the length of the season T . If it is short enough T ≤ T1
(where the value T1 has been defined in (7)), then the behavior of the mutant coincides with
the behavior of the resident and the main population can not be invaded: the amount of
offspring produced by the mutant is the same as produced by the resident. If the length of
the season is larger than T > T1 there is a period of the life-time of the resident when it
applies the intermediate strategy and spares some amount of the resource for its future use.
The mutant is able to use this fact and there exists a strategy of the mutant that guarantees
better result for it.
Let us introduce the analogue of the value function U˜m for the resident and denote it as
U˜r:
U˜r(pr, pm, n, t) =
∫ T
T−t
pr(s)(1 − ur(s)) dt .
The value U˜(0, 0, n(0), T ) represents the amount of eggs laid by the resident during the season
of length T . Its value depends on the state of the system and the following transformation
can be done
U˜r(pr, pm, n, t) = nUr(xr , xm, t) .
In the following we omit some parameters and write the value function in the simplified
form Ur(T )
.
= Ur(0, 0, T ) where the initial conditions xr(0) = xm(0) = 0 have been taken
into account.
In the region A (see Fig. 8) the value functions for both populations of mutants and
residents are equal to each other
Um(T ) = Ur(T ) = x1e
−c(T−τ1) .
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Here the value τ1 can be defined from the intersection of the trajectory and the switching
curve Sr ∩ Sm:
1− e−τ1 =
e(c−1)(T−τ1) − 1
c− 1
.
To obtain the value functions in the regions B and C let one solve the system of charac-
teristics (3.3) in case when the characteristics move along the surface Sσr and um = 1. This
leads to the following characteristic equations for the Hamiltonian (27):
x′r = −
x2rc
2 + xrc
, x′m = xm
2− xrc
2 + xrc
− 1, U ′m = −Um
x2rc
2 + xrc
.
We can rewrite them in the form
dxm
dxr
=
2 + xrc− xm(2 − xrc)
x2rc
,
dUm
dxr
=
2Um
xr
,
and consequently
xm = C1x
2
re
τ + xrz + 1, Um = C2x
2
r, C1, C2 = const . (31)
where C1 and C2 are defined from the boundary conditions while the equation (5) is also
fulfilled.
Along the singular arc Sˆσ the mutant is using the intermediate strategy (21). In this
case
U ′m = −Umzur + xm(1− um) = −Um
2xrc
2 + xrc
+
1 + xrc
4
.
Since x′r = −
x2
r
c
2+xrc
we have
dUm
dxr
=
2Um
xr
−
(1 + xrc)(2 + xrc)
4x2rc
.
Then
Um = C3x
2
r +
4 + 3xrc(3 + 2xrc)
24xrc
, C3 = const . (32)
We undertake now to compute the limiting season length T2 that separates the region B
from the region C. The coordinates of the point B have been obtained before and satisfy the
equations (3.3). To define the coordinates of the point (xσr2 , x
σ
m2
, τσ2 ) of intersection of the
optimal trajectory with the curve AD let use the dynamics of the motion along the surface
Sσr with ur = uˆr and um = 1 (31):
xm = C1x
2
re
τ + xrz + 1, C1 = const ,
where C1 should be chosen such that
xm2 = C1x
2
r2
eτ2 + xr2c+ 1, xm2 =
2 + xr2c
4
= 1− e−τ2 .
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Then
C1 =
(xr2c− 2)(3xr2c+ 2)
16x2r2
.
After that the coordinates xσr2 , x
σ
m2
and τσ2 can be defined from the following conditions
xσm2 = x
σ
2 = C1(x
σ
r2
)2eτ
σ
2 + xσr2c+ 1, τ
σ
2 = − lnx
σ
r2
+
2
xσr2c
−
4
c
.
The boundary value T2 can be obtained as
T2 = τ
σ
2 +
ln(xσr2(c− 1) + 1)
c− 1
.
Now compute the value functions Ur(T ) and Um(T ) for the region B (T1 < T ≤ T2),
where only the mutant keeps the bang-bang type of the control. For the resident population
we have
Ur(T ) = Ur2e
−c(T−τ2), Ur2 = xr2(1 − xr2) +
1− 2xr2
c
. (33)
where the point with coordinates (xr2 , xr2 , τ2) defines the intersection of the trajectory and
surface Sσr :
τ2 = − lnxr2 +
2
xr2c
−
4
c
, xr2 =
e(c−1)(T−τ2) − 1
c− 1
. (34)
For the mutant population the value function Um in the region with u = uˆ and um = 1
satisfies the equation coming from (31):
U (uˆ,1)m = x
2
m1
(
xr
xr1
)2
, (35)
where (xr1 , xm1 , τ1) is a point of the intersection of the trajectory with the curve AB (see
Fig. 8). Using (35) and notations of (34), we can write
Um(T ) = Um2e
−c(T−τ2), Um2 = x
2
m1
(
xr2
xr1
)2
,
which is analogous to (33).
For the region C the value function for the resident has the same form as in (33) but it
has a different form for the mutant. Suppose that the optimal trajectory is coming to the
surface Sσ at point with coordinates (x˜r2 , x˜m2 , τ˜2). Then the Bellman function at this point
is equal
U˜m2 = x˜
2
r2
(
c2
16
−
4 + 3x˜r2c
24x˜3r2c
)
+
3x˜r2c(2x˜r2c+ 3) + 4
24x˜r2c
,
which is written using (32) with definition of the constant C3 from the given boundary
conditions.
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When the optimal trajectory moving along the surface Sσ intersects the curve AD at
some point with coordinates (x˜σr2 , x˜
σ
m2
, τ˜σ2 ) (see Fig. 8) the Bellman function can be expressed
as follows
U˜σm2 = U˜m2
(
x˜σr2
x˜r2
)
.
Then
Um(T ) = U˜
σ
m2
e−c(T−τ
σ
2 ) .
The difference in the values functions (amount of offspring per mature individual) of
the mutant and optimally behaving resident is shown on Fig. 10. In way we can derive
the expressions for the number of offspring produced by the resource population during the
season.
3.5 Generalization on the small enough but non-zero values of ε
In this section we consider a case of non-zero ε but such that the condition (24) remains
fulfilled. This means that the trajectory coming to the singular surface Sσr does not cross it
but moves along it due to the chattering regime applied by the resident (23).
In this case the phase space can be also divided in two regions: the points with xr smaller
or larger than the ones on Sσr . In each of this region the structure of the solution has similar
properties as in the case considered above when ε is arbitrary small. Inside the surface Sσr
the optimal behavior has also a similar to a previous case structure.
In the region with values xr larger than the ones on the surface Sσr there is a part of the
switching surface Sm and a singular arc Sσ1 where the mutant uses an intermediate strategy.
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The surface Sσ1 can be defined through the expression (22). In the other region we also have
a part of Sm and a singular arc Sσ2 which is different from S
σ
1 and could not exist for some
values of the parameters of the problem c and ε.
To identify the values for which the surface Sσ2 is a part of the solution let us write
necessary conditions similarly to (29-30):
H
∣∣∣
ur=1
= 0, Am = 0, A
′
m = {AmH} = 0 .
Using these equations we are able to obtain the values of λr, λm and ν on the surface Sσ2 and
substitute them into the second derivative A′′m = {{AmH}H} = 0 to derive the expression
for the singular control applying by the mutant on this surface:
um =
2xm − (1− ε)c(1 + xm)
2− (1− ε)c+ xmεc
. (36)
There are several conditions which should be necessarily satisfied. First of all, the control
(36) should be between zero and one
0 ≤
2xm − (1− ε)c(1 + xm)
2− (1 − ε)c+ xmεc
≤ 1 (37)
Second of all, the Kelley condition should be also fulfilled [16, p. 200]:
∂
∂um
d2
dt2
∂H
∂um
= {Am{AmH}} ≤ 0 .
This leads to the inequality
2− (1 − ε) + xmεc ≥ 0 (38)
In particular, both conditions (37) and (38) give that xm ≤ 2/(2− c).
To construct the singular arc Sσ2 we should substitute the singular control um from (37)
and ur = 1 into dynamics (13):
x′m = xm(1 − c((1− ε)ur + εum))− um
with boundary conditions obtained from the tangency condition of the optimal trajectory
coming from the domain um = ur = 1 on the switching surface Sm:
xm
(
− ln
(
1−
1
2− c(1 − ε)
))
=
1
2− c(1− ε)
Such tangency takes place only if
0 ≤
1
2− c(1− ε)
≤ 1
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Figure 11: Structure of the optimal behavioral pattern for c = 1.25 and ε = 0.35
that comes from the condition that a singular surface Sm exists only for 0 ≤ xm < 1. This
gives the following inequality
1− c(1− ε) ≥ 0
for the existence of the surface Sσ2 . One can check that the inequalities (37-38) are fulfilled
as well. The result of the construction of the optimal pattern for some particular case is
shown on Fig. 11.
4 Long-term evolution of the system
[10] introduced model (2) as the intra-seasonal part of a more complex multi-seasonal popula-
tion dynamics model in which consumer and resources survive during one season only. They
considered that the (immature) offspring produced by the consumers and ressources through
some season i and defined by equations (3) would mature during the inter-season to form
the initial consumer and resource populations of season (i+1). Up to some proportionnality
constants accounting for the efficiency of the reproduction processes as well as overwintering
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mortality, [10] obtained the following relation between the number of consumers of season
(i+ 1) and the initial number of resources of season (i+ 1):
ci+1 = αJi, ni+1(t = 0) = βJn,i,
with Ji and Jn,i defined in equations (3).
In the present mutant invasion model, the total consumer population is structured into
(1−εi)ci residents and εici mutants that have different reproduction strategies. Taking into
account this structure and assuming that mutants’ progeny is also composed of mutants, we
get the following inter-seasonal part for the mutant invasion model.
cri+1 = αU˜r(ci, εi, ni, T ), cmi+1 = αU˜m(ci, εi, ni, T ), ni+1 = βV˜ (ci, εi, ni, T )
where the values U˜r, U˜m and V˜ denote here the number of eggs/seeds produced by each
(sub-)population:
U˜r = (1− εi)ci
∫ T
0
(1− ur(t))pr(t) dt, U˜m = εici
∫ T
0
(1− um(t))pm(t) dt,
V˜ =
∫ T
0
n(t) dt .
U˜r, U˜m and V˜ can be computed from the solution of the optimal control problem (9)
with the dynamics (8). Their values depend on the strategy chosen by the mutant and the
resident, the length of the season T , the values ci and εi and initial conditions which are
pr(0) = pm(0) = 0 and n(0) = ni. For a particular case ε = 0 the values U˜r and U˜m were
derived analytically in subsection 3.4. In the following we investigate numerically this model
on typical example; in particular we are interested in the long term fate of the resident and
mutant consumer populations.
A previous investigation of the inter-seasonal model with collective optimal behavior of
the consumers (i.e. there are no mutants such that ε = 0) has shown that the behavior
of the system in long-term perspective could have very rich properties. Depending on the
parameters of the problem, the value of β and the length of season T , there could be an
extinction of the resource or a or blowing up of the system (which leads to the suicide
of the consumers). The system could also tend to some stable periodic behavior or to a
globally asymptotic equilibrium. The last two cases illustrate a possible co-existence of the
interacting species [10].
Here, we follow an adaptive dynamics like approach and consider that the resident con-
sumer and the ressource population are at a (globally stable) equilibrium and investigate
what happens when a small fraction of mutants appear in the resident consumer population.
We actually assume that resident consumers are “naive" in the sense that even if the mutant
population becomes large through the season-to-season reproduction process, the resident
consumers keep their collective optimal strategy and take mutants as cooperators, even if
they do not cooperate.
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We investigated numerically a case when α = 2, β = 0.5 and T = 4. The system is
near the long-term stable equilibrium point c = 0.9055 and n = 1.0848 as at the beginning
of some season a mutant population of small size cm = 0.001 appears. The mutant pop-
ulation increases its frequency within the consumer population (see Fig. 12) and modifies
the dynamics of the system (Fig. 13). The naive behavior of the consumers is detrimental
to their progeny: along the seasons, mutant consumers progressively take the place of the
collectively optimal residents and even replace them in the long run (Fig. 12), making the
mutation successful. We should however point out that the mutants’ strategy as described
in (9) is also a kind of “collective" optimum: in some sense, it is assumed that the mutants
cooperate with the other mutants. If the course of evolution drives the resident population
to 0 and only mutants survive in the long run, this means that the former mutants become
the new residents, with actually the exact same strategy as the one of the former residents
they took the place from. Hence they are also prone to being invaded by non-cooperating
mutants. The evolutionary dynamics of this naive resident-selfish mutant-resource appears
thus to be a never-ending process: selfish mutants can invade and replace collective optimal
consumers, but in the end transforms into collective optimal consumers as well, and a new
selfish mutant invasion can start again. We are actually not in a “Red Queen Dynamics"
context since we focused on the evolution of one species only, and not co-evolution [17]. Yet,
what the Red Queen said to Alice seems to fit very well the situation we just described:
“here, you see, it takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place” [18].
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